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I In the Supre01e Court of the 
State of Utah 
RO~BERT K. DUSENBERRY and 
EDITH C. DUSENBERRY, hls wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
TAYLOR'S, a corporation, 
Defendant .and Respondenrt. 
CASE 
NO. 8712 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent -cannot accept ··the Statement of Facts set 
out in Appellants' Brief as a complete or proper statement. 
It is ·confined largely to 1Jhat testimony which supports 
appellants' theocy, disregarding the great weight of the 
evidence as found by the lower ~court. Appellants' Brief 
dramatically omits all of the testimony and evidence con-
cerning rthe intention of the original contract parties, the 
general practice of defendant in sales of his kind, and tJhe 
actual practice used by defendant in this particUlar sale. 
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This action was brought by plaintiffs praying for a 
Declaratory Judgment to determine the true owner of the 
carpets and drapes lin question (Prayer of Plaintffis' Com-
plaint). · Defendant prayed for the same relief -in its Ans-
wer (Prayer of defendant's Answer). The only relief re-
quested by either ·party was pertaining to the title of the 
carpets and draJP€S (Complaint and Answer) . There is· no 
evidence or issue tbefore this Court or the lower court that 
the m~han<tise in issue is a fixture in any way, manner, 
or form, many building. The term "wall-to-wall carpeting" 
is used for .the first time in Appellants' Brief. 
Prior to August 31, 1954, Mrs. G. L. Miller purchased 
various items o.f merehandise from defendant upon an open 
account. . Mrs. Miller periodically requested defendant to 
··hold: merohandise until she had finally deternrlned she 
wanted ·to purchase said merohandise (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No~ 1) ~- Mrs. MiNer selected various items of furniture, in-
cluding· ·carpets, linoleum and drupes, all of which were in-
;·voiced as started on Plaintiffs' Emibit No. 9 and page 2 of 
··Defendant's. Exhibit 8. That sometime after rthat a down 
payment of $300.00 was made on merchandise selected by 
MrS. Miller (Tr. 51). That during the selection of the mer-
··ohandise by Mrs. Miller, she told defendant's salesman, Mr. 
Steadman, that ·she intended to purchase and finance the 
·merchandise she was selecting ·upon defendant's contract 
·(Tr. 20). Defendant has only one contract form and that 
·this form ·contains a title retaining provision in it. On or 
about July 10, 1954, Mr. G. L. Miller· was interviewed for 
credit by "P.M.", on of defendant's employees (Defendant's 
Exhi:bit No. 7). On August 31, 1954, the carpets in ques-
tion, together with linoleum and other items, \vere posted 
upon defendanrt's Aecounts Receivable Ledger (~laintiffs' 
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3 
Exhibit No. 1) for :purposes of a bookkeeping entry (Tr. 
39). Thart the 'cash payment of $300.00 made by Mrs. Mil-
ler to defendant was transferred fvom rt:he hoJd sheets to 
the Accounts Receivable Ledger ·oo August 31, 1954 (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit No. 1). On Septe,mber 9, 1954, Mrs. Miller 
executed defendant's ·contract, and defendant posted the 
carpets in question, together with other items, to defend-
ant's Notes Receivable Ledger (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1, 
page 2). '!bart on rthe same day, September 9, 1954, Mrs. 
Miller purchased drapes from defendant (Page 2, Plain-
tiffs' Exhtbit No. 1) and executed a Conditional Sales Con-
tract (Plaintiffs' EX!hi:bit No. 2) which specifically retained 
title. 
Subsequent ·to the making of the invoice and the exe-
cution of the ·Conditional Sales Contract by Mrs. Miller 
Plaintiffs' EXJhibit No. 2) (Tr. 35), and prior to September 
30, 1954, the 'Carpeting and dvapes in issue herein were de-
livered and installed by defendant in the home of Mrs. Mil-
ler Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1). That on September 30, 1954, 
the final determination was made of the purchase price of 
said carpeting and drapes, and Mrs. Miller was given credit 
upon her Alccount Receivable Ledger (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 1) ~or the .carpet pad not used in the Miller house and 
labor not used (Tr. 24). 
It was the custom and practice of defendant to post 
selected merchandise to its Accounts Receivable Ledger 
of its customers as a bookkeeping entry for the purposes 
of its records until the customer executed the intended con-
tract (Tr. 43); that the invo~ce of said merchandise was 
either marked "charge" or ",Contract" (Tr. 32) after de-
livery of the merohadise to the customer (Tr. 43). That 
in the case of carpeting and floor eovering and drapes, the 
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final 1purchase price was not determined until after the 
merchandise was installed whenever defendant was to make 
the insrtallartion, and the amount of material used, plus the 
labor eharge, was finally determined and then charged (Tr. 
24). 
The plaintiffs purchased a home situated in Orem, 
Utah, from the conditional vendee, Mrs. Mill&; that at the 
time of the pUI"ohase of the home, plaintiffs WeTe not aware 
of rtJhe outSJtanding eontract between defendant and Mrs. 
Miller, and had no actual knowledge until September, 1956; 
that at tJhe time of the pUI"ohase orf the home by plaintiffs 
from Mrs. Miller, Mrs. Miller attempted to sell the carpets 
and drapes in issue to plaintiffs; rthat plaintiffs made no in-
quiry concerning the alleged title af the subject property 
in Mrs. Miller, otheT than the fact that Mrs. Miller had pos-
session of said property (Tr. 4) . 
Defendant had made numerous demands for paYJ.nent 
upon Mrs. Miller, and received many promises that were 
ot kept by Mrs. Miller (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) (Tr. 44). 
Defendant was not aware of the sale of 1Jhe Miller house 
by Mrs. MilleT to plainrtiff until the summer of 1956 ('l'r. 
44). Plaintiffs 'did not obtain a Bill of Sale of any kind 
from Mrs. Miller to indicate ownership of the said personal 
property. The only written evidence before the Court is a 
letter purportedly written by Mrs. Miller (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit No. 5) during the negotiations of the sale o[ the house 
to plaintiffs. ':Dhe final ·contract between plaintiffs and Mrs. 
Miller does not indicate a transfer of title of carpets or 
drapes to plaintiffs. Neither ·the deed (Plaintiffs' Ex·hibirt 
No. 3) nor the mortgage (Plaintiff's E)Chibit No. 4) show 
any evidence of ·title in the plaintiffs. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND 
HOLDING THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING WAS 
STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT. THE COURT DID 
NOT RULE UPON THE TITLE '110 THE TILE AND LI-
NOLEUM. 
POINT II 
THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT IS VALID 
AND ENFO·RCEABLE. IT MEETS ALL STATUTORY 
REQUffiEMENTS AS 'DO ITS ENFORCEABILITY. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF1S ARE N'OT PUR·CHASERS OF RE.A!.L-
TY WITH FIXTURES A 'IT ACHED. PLAINTIFFS HAVE 
NOT RECEIVED TITLE TO THE MERCHANDISE FROM 
ANY SOURCE. 
POINT IV 
RUSS.ELL VS. HARKNESS IS AUTHORITY O·N 
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID· NOT ERR IN FINDING AND 
HOLDING THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING WAS 
STILL VESTED IN DEFEND~NT. THE C!OURT D~ID 
NOT RULE UPON THE TITLE TO THE TILE AND LI-
NOLEUM. 
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':Dhe facts as determined by the lower court clearly show 
that Mrs. Miller, the conditional vendee of the carpets and 
drapes art issue, selected rtJhe carpets, made a down payment 
with a request to hold the merchandise; told the salesman 
before and during the selection of the carpets and drapes 
that she intended to purchase ·the merchandise upon a con-
tract; that defendant had only one ty1pe of eontract, which 
retained title in the seller until the merchandise was paid 
fior; ·that Mr. Miller was interviewed for credit; that at the 
time of making out the invoice for the carpeting the final 
purohase price was not determined fior the reason that the 
actual amount of carpeting and labor ~could not be deter-
mined until after it was installed ·and the labor performed 
by defendant as agreed upon. That subsequent to the de-
livery of the ca~s a bookkeeping entry was made on de-
fendant's Accounts Receivable Ledger, and the merchandise 
transferred from a hold sheet of defendant. That subse-
quent to this bookkeeping entry upon defendant's Accounts 
Receivable Ledger, Mrs. Miller executed the contract in evi-
dence, and another bookkeeping entry was made by de-
fendant ·to transfer the account to the ·contract ledger. That 
the final purchase price on the carpets was not determined 
until after the contract was signed by Mrs. Miller. 
It was the intention of the conditional vendor and ven-
dee that title to the subject personal property should re-
main in rthe defendant until after the said property was paid 
for. Property in specific goods passes when the parties so 
intend. (60-2-2, UCA 1953: E. C. Olsen Co. vs. Tax Com-
mission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d 324, 331). 
':Dhis was a eontract to sen prior to the execution of the 
Conditional Sales Contract, and the final detennination of 
the purchase priee. "Dhe contract of sale was made at the 
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time of the execution of the Condi~tional Sales Contract. 
WheTe there is a contract to sen specifie goods, or where 
goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the 
seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriation, 
reserve the right of possession or property in the goods un-
til certain conditions have been fulfilled. The right of 
possession or pPoperrty may be thus reserved notwithstand-
ing the delivery od: tJhe goods to the buyer, or to a earrier 
or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buy-
er. (G0-2-4 (1) UCA 1953. 
rrh~ contract was not final until the purchase price was 
ascertained, and this was not done until the subject prop-
erty was installed in the house and the exact amount of 
mateTial and labor determined to compute the final pur-
chase pri~ce. 
When terms for payment left for future determination, 
the contract is incomplete. Hi-Way Motor Company vs. 
Service Motors Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 P. 133. 
The merchandise was not in a deliverable state at the 
time plaintiffs allege title passed, for the parties agreed 
that defendant was to perform the labor. 
"Where there is a ·contract to sell specific goods, 
and the seller is bound to do something to the goods 
for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, 
the property does not pass until such thing is done." 
60-2-3 (2) UCA 1953. 
Defendant's posting upon its Accounts Receivable 
Ledger of the ca.vpets was ~merely a bookkeeping entry for 
the purpose o[ keeping a record o[ where the mevchandise 
was after delivery by defendant to :the house of ·conditional 
buyer. It was not the final agreement between defendant 
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and eondition.al vendee. The defendant's method of book-
keeping is not important or determinative as to the nature 
of rtJhe contract. Ford Motor Company vs. Nartional Bond 
& Investment Co., Illinois, 14 NE 2d 306, 175 ALR 1372. 
'1.1here is no written evidence presented by plaintiffs 
upon which to base their claim otf title to the property in 
question, the drapes and carpets. The letter to plaintiffs 
from Mrs. Miller was apparently written during the negotia-
tions for the sale of the house (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5) . 
The final eontract, the deed and mortgage (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibits Nos. 3 and 4) do not evidence any transfer of title 
to the carpets or drapes to plaintiffs. There is no Bill of 
Sale in evidence. Plaintiffs have nothing upon which to 
base their alleged title. 
The Statute of Frauds requires that a sale of merchan-
dise valued in excess of $500.00 be in writing. 25-5-1 to 9, 
UCA 1953. There is no such writing in evidence before 
this Court. 'Dhe original cost of the carpets alone was $1,-
267.32, and ~they were only one year old when the pur-
ported sale was made by Mrs. Miller to plaintiffs. Defend-
ant intended to and did comply with Statute of Frauds by 
the execution of the Conditional Sales Oonrtract. 
This was clearly a conditional sale and not a chattel 
mortgage, as argued by plaintiffs. A Conditional Sales Con-
tract as defined in 15-1-2a (c), UCA 1953, is as follows: 
(1) (a) "Any contract for sale of tangible personal 
property, with or without accessories, under which 
possession is delivered to the buyer but the title vests 
in the buyer 1hereafter only upon the payment of all 
or part of the price, or upon ~the performance of any 
other eondlition." 
(1) (1C) "Any contract for the sale of any tangible 
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personal property, with or without accessories, under 
wthioh the possession is delivered to the buyer, and a 
lien upon the property is to vest in tJhe seller as S€CUT-
ity for the payment of part or all of rthe price, or for 
the performance of ~any other condition.'' 
The ·aJbove statute clearly defines the Conditional Sales 
Contract in issue as a conditional sale. The title never 
passed. Title was retained by defendant at all tiems. Title 
has to pass before a ehatrtel mortgage may be obtained. 
Freed Furniture and Carpet ·Co. vs. Sorensen, 28 .Urtah 
419, 432, 79 P. 564, 568, defines a conditional sale as "a sale 
in whtch the transfer of title to the thing sold, to the pur-
chaser, or retention of it, is made to depend upon the per-
formance of some condition." 
This is not a situation where the 1nerchandise was so~d 
for resale to a dealer who had apparent authority to sen 
the me1~handise. Mrs. Miller had no apparent -authority 
to sell other than possession of the merchandise itself. Pos-
session alone is not sufficient to rely upon. Russell vs. 
Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P. 865. 
'f.he drapes were purchased the same date the Condi-
tional Sales Contract was executed. There is no question 
but what the title to the drapes remained with the defend-
ant. 
In summary, this was a eonditiooal sale by defendant 
to Mrs. Miller, and not a chattel mortgage. !Defendant re-
tained title to the said property at all times and stages of 
the negotiations between Mrs. Miller and defendant. There 
\Vas no absolute sale until the Cb.ndiftional Sales ~Contract 
was executed and 1Jhe final purchase price determined. Mrs. 
Miller had no tirtle to eonvey to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have 
no present evidence of title to ·the said personal iJ'roperty. 
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POINT II 
THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT IS VALID 
AND ENF10RCEABLE. IT MEETS ALL STATUTORY 
REQUIREME.NTS AS TO ITS ENFORCEABILITY. 
The c·onditional Sales ~Contr.act in issue herein is valid 
and enforceable. 
The contract was signed by the original buyer, Mrs. 
G. L. Miller, the ~contm.cting party with defendant. Mrs. 
G. L. Miller was not the contracting party, as alleged by 
plaintiffs in their brief (Plaintiffs' EX1hibit 2). 
15-1-2a (B-1) is a statute regulating the rate of inter-
est to be ·charged on conditional sales contracts. The lower 
court specifically determined that usury was not an issue in 
this case (Tr. 112). 'Dhe evidence of defendant proved be-
yond doubt that there was no question of usury on the 
Conditional Sales Contract (Tr. 43). 
The eompliance of the provision of the above statute 
which states that the parties to the contract should both 
sign the contract is not mandatory. The second paragraph 
of 15-1-2a (B-5) states as follows: "If the seller, except 
as the result of an accidental or bona fide error in compu-
tation shall violate any other ·provision of this section, such 
failure shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability 
of the conditional sales contract.'' 
The only forfeiture provision of the said statute is in 
the event seller intentionally violate the interest provisions 
of the chapter. 15-1-2a (B-5). Errors in computation 
made in good fiaith are e~sable. The statute itself spe-
cifically states that the failure of seller to sign the condi-
tional sales contract does not affect its validity or enforce-
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ability. Pl·aintiffs' contention to the contrary is entirely 
without merit. 
A statute is not mandatory unless a forfeiture provi-
sion in ~the statute makes the mission to perform fatal. 
Clark Montana Realty Company vs. Butte, etc., Copper 
Co., 233 Fed. 547, Affd. 249 U. S. 12 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT PURCHASERS OF REAL· 
TY WITH FIXTURES ATTACHED. PLAINTIFFS HAVE 
NOT RECEIVED TITLE TO THE MERCHANDISE FROM 
ANY SOURCE. 
There is no evidence in the entire record that the car--
peting in issue is wall to wall carpeting, or that the carpet:. 
ing is or was attached to a building, temporarily or other-
wise. The only and first place that wall to wall carpeting 
is mentioned is in Appellants' Brief. 
As pointed out in my Statement of Facts herein, there 
is no issue before the Court pevtaining :tJO linoleum or tile 
(See prayers orf Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendant's Ans-
wer. See Judgment). 
There was no evidence taken by the lower court as to 
whether or not the carpets or drapes are fixtures to any 
building or reality. The burden of proof is on appellant to 
prove that the ·merchandise was permanently attached to 
the realrty, and will be treated as chattels rather :than as 
fixtures in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 
Strong vs. Sunset Oopper Company, Washington, 114 P. 
2d 526, 135 ALR 423. 
Even assuming the merchandise at issu~ was attached 
to· realty, personal property may retain its eharacter as ;such 
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where it is agreed ,by parties interested, even though an-
nexed to realty. 42 Am. Jur. 209, Sec. 29. 
POINT IV 
RUSSELL VS. HARKNESS IS AUTHORITY ON 
THE F1ACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
Russell vs. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 Pac. 865, Afd. 118 
U. S- H63, is very similar to the instant case. The reports 
of the case do not state when possession was taken by the 
conditional vendee other than as described as follows on 
page 866 of 7 Pac. 865: "that Phelan & Ferguson took 
possession of the property in Idaho, where it was at date 
of contract, and remained in 1possession until the second 
day m December, 1882." This does not disclose whether 
possession was taken before, during, or after the date of 
the : contract. 
The record does not disclose any attempt on the part 
of plaintiffs to determine whether or not Mrs. Miller had 
a valid title or not to the merchandise she proposed to sell; 
nor did they obtain any evidence of title from her . 
. On page 868 of 7 Bac. 865, "every person competent 
to contract is presumed to know that possession alone is 
not sufficient to ~convey good title as against the owner, 
and if the purchaser relies upon it without inquiry, he does 
it at his peril." It is the duty of a purchaser to inquire and 
see that the vendor has good title to his property which he 
undertakes to sell. 
The plainrtiffs certainly could have protected them-
selves by a simple inquiry as to where the merchandise was 
purchased, and if it was paid for. They could have with-
held payment until this was determined. 
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In-Russell vs. Harkness, the Utah Supreme Court quotes 
wirth approval from Coggill vs. H~ord & N. H. R. Co., 3 
Gray 545, Mass, as follmvs: 
"The vendee in such cases having no right to the 
property, can pass none to others. He has only a bare 
right of possession., and those who claim under him, 
either as creditors or purchasers, can acquire no higher 
or better title. Such is the necessary rule of carrying 
into effect the intention of the parties to a conditional 
sale and delivery. There is no good reason or equity 
in placing the burden of a fraudulent sale by a vendee·, 
in violaltion of the condition on which he received the 
property, upon a bona fide vendor, ~arther than upon 
a bona fide purchaser. On the contrary, if either is 
to lose by his fraudulent act, it should be fue latter, 
who has dealt with a party having no authority, in-
stead of the former, who relies upon a valid subsisting 
contract as the fonndation of his claim. It is the duty 
of the purchaser to inquire and see that his vendor has 
a good title ·to the property which he undertakes to 
sell:" 
While it is true that in Russell vs. Harkness the pur-
chaser from the conditional vendee, ast the time of the pur-
chase, knew that the merchandise was not paid for and 
knew tJhaJt the conditional vendor claimed title thereto, the 
Utah Suprem Court clearly states that a purchaser cannot 
rely upon mere possession alone in a conditional vendee 
and purchase the merchandise without fulfilling his duty 
of inquiry to determine whether or not the conditional ven-
deh as good title or not before he advances money on the 
purchase. It is the purchaser who does not perform his 
duty· of inquiry who should suffer any loss ra!ther than the· 
conditional vendor who relies upon ·his valid contract. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence is abundant to support lower court. 
The original~conrtracting parties· did not intend title to 
pass to vendee nntil merchandise was paid f,or. Title re-
mained and does still remain in defendant. This was a con-
ditional sale of personal property as intended by both par-
ties to the ~oonwact. Plaintiffs received no title or even any 
evidence off title from conditional vendee. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affumed, 
with costs to defendant and respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS S. TAYLOR, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
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